

Migration

an overview



European Broadcasting Union
Strategic Information Service



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A Glance At Migration

After fifty years of greater outflow than inflow of migrants, Western Europe has in the past decades become the destination for a greater number of immigrants than it sends abroad. According to 2005 data, all countries of Western Europe (the European Union's first 15 members (EU-15), Norway, and Switzerland) have a positive migration balance, as do six of the 10 new EU Member States – Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Slovenia, and Slovakia.


In early 2006, the total population of Western and Central Europe, the Balkans, and Turkey was 594 million. The European Union (EU-25) accounted for 462 million inhabitants, 389 million (84 percent) of which were either citizens or foreign residents of the EU-15. 73 million are citizens or foreign residents of the 10 new EU Member States. Bulgaria and Romania, on track for EU membership, have a combined population of 29.3 million. Turkey's population is 72.5 million. Non EU states located in geographical Western Europe - Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland - have a combined population of 12 million. 17 million people reside in the Western Balkans: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro (including Kosovo).

Despite the ease of intra-community migration, the overwhelming majority of Europeans reside in the country of their birth.

Austria

According to the 2001 census, roughly 730,000 (or 9.1 percent) of Austria's 8 million inhabitants are foreign born, the majority – about 63% - of those having origins in Europe (principally the former Yugoslavia and Turkey). Between 1985 and 2001, over 254,000 foreign born residents were naturalized. 4% or about 400,000 of Austria's 8 million residents identify as Muslims. 120,000 Muslims reside in Vienna, about 50,000 of whom are Austrian citizens.

Belgium



Evolution of Belgium's Foreign Population by Region

With a population of just over 10 million, Belgium has net migration rate of 1.25 per thousand. 58% of the population is Fleming, 31% is Walloon, and 11% "mixed" or other. In 2000, Belgium's (legal) population of foreign nationals reached 8.8 percent. The most numerous nationality is Italian, with 200,000 Italian nationals resident in Belgium. The second most common foreign nationality among residents of Belgium is Moroccan; about 120,000 Moroccans reside in Belgium, the vast majority in Brussels. French, Dutch, Turks, Spanish and Germans make up, in that order, the majority of remaining foreign nationals resident in Belgium.

Czech Republic

There are just over 10 million residents of the Czech Republic, which has a net migration rate of just under one per thousand residents. Ethnically, according to the 2001 census, the population is divided thusly: Czech 90.4%, Moravian 3.7%, Slovak 1.9%, Other 4%. Foreign nationals making up the Czech population are, in order, Slovak, German and Polish. Roma, both Czech and non Czech nationals, number about 12,000.

WWW.CZSO.CZ

Finland

Finland has a slightly lower net migration rate than the Czech Republic. 93% of the 5.2 million residents of Finland are native Finns. The only significant population of foreign residents are Swedes, making up 5.7%. A small number of other foreign nationals reside in the country: Russians 0.4%, Estonians 0.2%. The Finnish population also includes as small ethnic minority population; Roma (0.2%) and Sami (0.1%)

France

France population of over 60 million is one of the most ethnically diverse in Europe. The net migration rate is 0.66/1000. Ten percent of French residents, citizen and non-citizen, identify to some extent as Muslim. The largest minority group, including French born and foreign born, citizen and foreign national, are North Africans, most of Algerian origin, as well as Moroccan and Tunisian. There are also significant populations of Sub-Saharan Africans, Afro-Caribbeans both French and foreign nationals, and Asians, from China, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Vietnam. In 1999, the total number of immigrants resident in France was 4.5 million, 1.5 million of whom had acquired French citizenship. Nearly 2 million were European, 1.6 million African, .5 million Asian, and the rest from the Americas and Oceania.

More information:

<http://www.ined.fr/>

<http://www.insee.fr>

Germany

91% of Germany's 82.5 million residents are ethnically German. The largest ethnic minority is Turkish (2.4%), including citizens and foreign nationals (the latter both German born and foreign born). Germany has a net migration rate of 2.8/1000. 6.1% of the population is of Greek, Italian, Polish, Russian, Serbo-Croatian, and Spanish origin. German reunification created a unique immigration situation in the 1990s:

With the fall of the Iron Curtain and the end of travel restrictions from the former Eastern Bloc countries, an additional three million ethnic Germans returned to Germany between 1988 and 2003. Almost 2.2 million of these arrived from the former territory of the Soviet Union, with Poland (575,000) and Romania (220,000) providing the remaining flows.

The number of these arrivals peaked at 400,000 in 1990. However, by the early 1990s, after the initial euphoria of the end of the Cold War and German reunification, the government had begun to take measures to moderate the returns. These included aid to ethnic German communities in countries of origin to improve their living standards and entice them to remain there. In addition, the government established a quota system. From 1993 to 1999 the quota was set at 225,000 people per year; this was subsequently reduced to 103,000. As a result, in 2000 and 2001, the immigration of ethnic Germans hovered at roughly 100,000 per year. In the following years, the number further declined and amounted to 91,000 in 2002. In 2003, the number was still much lower, when 73,000 immigrated to their ancestral homeland. Germany's Ministry of Interior estimates the number of remaining ethnic Germans in Eastern Europe and the territories of the former Soviet Union at around 1.5 million.

Besides affecting numbers, the government measures also affected the composition of the countries of origin. Since 1993, more than 90 percent of the total Aussiedler immigration has come from the territory of the former Soviet Union. The remaining Aussiedler from other Eastern European countries, meanwhile, have had to prove that they face discrimination because of their German ethnic origins in order to immigrate to their ancestral homeland.

Compared to other immigrants, Aussiedler enjoy certain privileges that are thought to foster their integration into society and the labor market. These privileges include

assistance with language training, employment, and welfare. Nevertheless, Aussiedler, especially those who came since mid-1990s, continue to face severe economic and social integration problems. One reason is their poor knowledge of German. In 2003, only 20 percent of the immigrants admitted under the Aussiedler quota were ethnic German. The remaining 80 percent were dependent family members. Unlike their ethnic German relatives, the immigrating family members do not have to prove sufficient knowledge of German. In 1993, the composition of ethnic Germans and dependent family members was nearly reversed, when only 25 percent were family members and 75 percent ethnic Germans.

- Veysel Oezcan, Social Science Centre Berlin

Greece


98% of Greece's 10 million residents are Greek. The net migration rate is 2.34/1000. Half the remaining 2% of the population is Albanian.

Hungary

Hungary's net immigration rate is 0.86/1000. About 95% of the population is native Hungarian, with the Roma minority accounting for 2% of that. Ethnic Hungarians with Slovakian origin and nationality make up another small portion of the ethnic Hungarian population. About 15,000 legal immigrants arrive yearly in Hungary. Romanians, nationals of the former FRY, and Ukrainians (the latter in large part ethnically Hungarian) make up the majority of foreign nationals resident in Hungary. There is also a small minority of Chinese.

<http://portal.ksh.hu>

Ireland



Ireland has a population of 4 million. The economic boom in the 1990s resulted, in 1996, in Ireland becoming the last of the EU nations to achieve net immigration. About half the immigration to Ireland in the 90s was "return immigration" of ethnic

Irish, dropping to 42% in the period 2000-2003. 10 percent of the population resident in 2002 was foreign born (including about 1.3 percent born in Northern Ireland). The share of residents born outside the EU-15 was about 3%. In 2002, the first year when the Census of the Population included a question on nationality, there were about 88,500 non-EU-15 nationals – 2% of the total population - resident in Ireland. Asylum flows to Ireland increased greatly as a result of the “Celtic Tiger” boom. In 2002 - the year when applications peaked - the top six stated countries of origin of asylum seekers were Nigeria (34.8 percent), Romania (14.4 percent), Moldova (4.6 percent), Zimbabwe (3.1 percent), Ukraine (3.0 percent), and Poland (2.7 percent).

Italy

The population of Italy is approximately 59 million. The net migration rate is 2/1000. In 2000, Italy's official statistics reported 272,000 legal admissions of immigrants from Albania, Morocco, Romania, China, and the Philippines. The foreign born population of Italy rose from half a million in 1985 to 1.4 million in 2000, 850,700 of which had come to Italy for employment. In 2000, nationals of Morocco and Albania made up over 20% of the foreign born population. Other immigrant minorities of significant size, on the increase, hail from South America and China.

Latvia

Latvia's 2.3 million people are divided ethnically into Latvians, 57.7%, Russians 29.6%, Belarus 4.1%, Ukrainians 2.7%, Poles 2.5%, Lithuanians 1.4%, other 2% according to a census of 2002. The net migration rate is 2.25/1000. The largest minority, Russians, are divided into citizens and foreign nationals. In 2004, about half the ethnic Russians in Latvia were Latvian citizens; most ethnic Russians with Latvian citizenship are under age 10 due to a 1998 amendment to the 1994 law granting citizenship automatically to children born in independent Latvia. About 20% of Latvia's residents are noncitizens, with about 10,000 yearly acquiring Latvian citizenship.

Netherlands

The net immigration rate of the Netherlands is 2.8/1000. 83% of the Netherlands 16.5 million residents are of Dutch origin and ethnicity. In 2003, 10.6% of the Dutch population was foreign born. Minority communities, made up of citizens and non-citizens, native and foreign born, are principally from Surinam, North Africa, the Antilles, Turkey, and Indonesia, but there are also significant minorities from sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.

More information:

<http://www.migrationinformation.org/GlobalData/countrydata/data.cfm>


Norway

Norway's 4.6 million residents are mostly ethnically Norwegian. The Sami minority numbers 20,000. 7% of Norwegian residents in 2002 were foreign born. Most of the immigrant population is from Pakistan, Sweden, and Denmark; new flows in 2004 arrived from Sweden, Russia, Denmark, and Poland (in that order). In 2004, 33,000 immigrants arrived with work permits. About 10,000 individuals arrived for family reunification yearly from 1999 to 2004.

Spain

Spain has a population of 40.3 million; the net migration rate is 0.99/1000. The number of foreign nationals resident in Spain more than doubled from half a million in 1995 to over a million (2.5%) in 2001. The majority of Spain's resident foreign nationals come for work, primarily in the service and agriculture sectors, but there are also a significant number of retirees and entrepreneurs from with the EU. In 2001, the foreign born population was divided: Moroccans (234,937), Ecuadorians (84,699), the British (80,183), Germans (62,506), Colombians (48,710), French (44,798), and Portuguese (42,634).

Switzerland




Asylum Applications In Switzerland

Switzerland has 7.5 million people, and a net migration rate of 3.58/1000. By the end of 2002, 21.6% of Swiss residents were foreign nationals. Only Luxembourg has a higher percentage of resident foreigners (37%). The largest groups of foreign nationals are Italians and citizens of the Former FRY, each accounting for about a quarter of the total. Germans, Austrians, Turks, French, Spanish and Portuguese are


the next largest groups, with only 6.2% of foreign nationals coming from Asia, 3.4% from the Americas and 3.3% from Africa,

United Kingdom




Concentration of foreign born residents in British Isles (source, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/born_abroad/countries/html/overview.stm)

Most common countries of birth outside British Isles, 2001



Countries of birth with biggest increase, 1991-2001



There are 60.4 million residents of the UK. The net migration rate is 2.1/1000. The native British population, like that of France, is ethnically more diverse than most European nations. 7.5% of UK residents were born abroad. Between 1991 and 2001, half of Britain’s population growth was due to immigration.

Recent Tales Of Migrants, Xenophobia, Racism and Media

- In summer 2006, Zinedine Zidane was expelled from the final match of his glorious footballing career for sending an Italian defender to the turf with a head-butt to the chest. Days of speculation on the provocation ended when it was reported that Zidane's act was in response to Materazzi's racist taunts. France forgave, indeed honoured, Zidane. The World Cup final between an ethnically diverse French side and a noticeably white and "native" Italian side gave rise to an explosion of racist comments reported in the press and much speculation on the meaning of nationality, nationalism and patriotism. The leftist philosopher Antonio Negri, lifelong supporter of Berlusconi's club AC Milan, found himself obliged in an interview in the French daily *Libération* (June 6, *In Italy, "catenaccio" is class war*) to defend football from the charge of guilt by association with fascism. On the 27th of June, one of the greatest footballers of all time, Johann Cruyff, blamed the Dutch hardline immigration minister Rita Verdonk, who had denied a desired player for the Dutch squad a passport, for the Netherlands' poor performance in the Cup. "'I want to say in particular that the minister is there to serve the country's interests and she clearly didn't do that,'" Cruyff said. "Not just for the World Cup, but for the coming ten years. I compare this to the technical director at a professional team. If a great player like Kalou would come to my club and the manager would send him away, he would have to draw his conclusions. The same goes for Verdonk." On June 29th the press reported: "The Dutch coalition government is in crisis after junior partner D66 sided with a motion of no confidence in Immigration Minister Rita Verdonk." Later that evening it was reported that the Dutch cabinet had resigned. The tournament's final was played in a stadium famous for being the scene of the Olympic Games where black American champion Jesse Owens refuted the myths of Aryan superiority before the eyes of the world and Hitler refused to congratulate him; the media seized the occasion of a return of the spotlight to this stadium for snippets of commentary on how far Europe has come studded with caveats about how far Europe has left to go. The World Cup tournament in general had been marked by an unusual amount of bigoted language, from coaches, politicians, and fans.

- In August, Bret Stephens wrote favorably in the *Wall Street Journal* of the re-branded Belgian far-right party Vlaams Belang (formerly the Vlaams Blok, which officially dissolved itself in 2004 after being convicted of inciting racial hatred). Remembering the party's history of Nazi sympathies and Holocaust denial, Stephens went on to say: "But that's changing. Younger party leaders, realizing their anti-Semitic taint was poison, began making pro-Israel overtures. And the party's tough-on-crime, hostile-to-Muslims stance began to attract a considerable share of the Jewish vote, particularly among Orthodox Antwerp Jews who felt increasingly vulnerable in the face of the city's hostile Muslim community. Today, Vlaams Belang is the largest single party in the country.... Meanwhile, the real fascists in Belgium are gaining strength, largely protected from scrutiny by the country's 'anti-racism'

legislation. At Brussels' Imam Reza mosque, a preacher commemorated the 17th anniversary of the Ayatollah Khomeini's death: 'The enemies cannot extinguish the light of the Islamic Revolution.' And in Molenbeek, the newspaper *Het Volk* published a study of the local Muslim population: The editor, Gunther Vanpraet, described the commune as 'a breeding ground for thousands of Jihad candidates.'" (*The Many Faces of Belgian Fascism, August 22, 2006*)

- In September 2006, the BBC's announcement that it had appointed a "Diversity Czar" was greeted with broad approval in the press.

- "Far-right candidates play Islamophobia and xenophobia because they do not have real political programs," Tarafa Baghajati, Deputy Chairman of the European Network Against Racism (ENAR), remarked with regard to the fear mongering tactics deployed in Austrian campaigns ahead of October elections. During the campaigns in early September, an explosive charge was planted outside the Austrian Muslim Youth (MJO) building in Vienna, destroyed by police in a controlled explosion. A neo-Nazi slogan found on the package read "July 4 1926, Weimar". The Freedom Party (FPÖ) distributed pamphlets describing Islam as a threat to the Christian identity of Austria. One of the FPÖ ads pictured St. Stephen's Cathedral in Vienna, the oldest church in the country, with an Islamic crescent in place of its crowning cross, over the caption: "This is the true hidden desire of Muslims." Another pictured a group of women in hijabs with warnings about Austria becoming a nation of immigrants.

- Also in September, Pope Benedict XVI delivered a speech perceived to be Islamophobic. In it he approvingly quoted the 14th-century Byzantine emperor Manuel II: "Show me just what Muhammad brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached." The speech was widely denounced as hostile and inflammatory across the political spectrum, by Muslim and non-Muslim alike.

- In October, under the shadow of the "Danish cartoon crisis", which established the theme of Muslim 'oversensitivity' in the media last year, some media producers exhibited their own oversensitivity to the prospect of Muslim oversensitivity in advance of any reaction at all. A German production of Mozart's *opera seria Idomeneo* was cancelled, the explanation given that the *mise en scène*, which involved *Idomeneo* entering the stage with the severed heads of Buddha, Mohammed, and Jesus, might offend Muslims and even provoke protests or attacks, especially in the wake of the controversial Papal speech. The German correspondent of the Amsterdam paper *Volksrant* however reported that it was no such matter. Kirsten Harms, he suggested, the opera company's director, seized the excuse of "Muslim oversensitivity" to rid herself of a production with which she had artistic problems. According to *Tagesspiegel* and *Die Welt*, the decision to cancel the production had indeed been

made before the Pope's infamous remarks, although Harms specifically offered the public reaction to the latter as her reason for aborting the new *Idomeneo*. In the language of weblogs, "Muslim oversensitivity" appears to have become a useful "meme" (the concept of self-replicating cultural unit introduced by philosopher Richard Dawkins) which no fears of Muslim oversensitivity to mischaracterisation as oversensitive will discourage the determined from making use of.

- *Wut* ("Anger"), a German made for television movie telling the story of a white German teenager stalked and harassed by a violent (ethnic) Turkish teens, was initially scheduled to be broadcast on a Wednesday at 20.15, but reconsideration of the programme resulted in the broadcaster shifting its airing to Friday evening at 22.00. The German press reported, "According to ARD director Thomas Gruber the made for television film is dangerous for the young, because it shows violence and vigilante justice as a means to solve conflicts. The WDR [the producer and broadcaster] criticized the move." In the Anglophone press however, the schedule shift was also attributed to nervousness about Muslim oversensitivity, which in turn gave rise to worries over "self-censorship" and caving in to intimidation at the expense of Freedom of Expression. The programme was watched by 2.67 million people, a televised discussion afterwards viewed by 1.27 million. 1500 calls were made the special hotline, where that night the program could also be discussed in Turkish.

- The Danish PSB, on Friday, October 6, broadcast an exposé revealed young members of a far right party mocking the Prophet Muhammad. Filmed in August by journalist Martin Rosengaard Knudsen undercover among the youth, the video showed members of the Danish People's Party (DPP) – a political ally of the centre-right coalition led by Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen – at a summer gathering competing to see who could draw the Prophet in the most humiliating manner. One cartoon appeared to depict the Prophet as a camel, urinating and drinking beer, over background music of a song: "The camel Muhammad has four beers..." The Prophet was also depicted in an explosive belt.

- Also in October, a controversy now frequently referred to in the Anglophone press as "Veilgate" was sparked when Jack Straw informed the press that he requested Muslim constituents visiting his surgery wearing the *niqab*, or full facial covering, remove their veils "to facilitate communication". One editorialist compared Straw's request to asking a non Muslim woman "to remove her blouse". This announcement elaborated a theme introduced somewhat earlier into the British press examining Muslim responsibility for "the failure of integration", and echoed the acrimonious debate which had preoccupied France for many months over the law prohibiting ostentation of religion in public schools, thus prohibiting the hijab. A few days later, headlines were splattered with the case of Aishah Azmi, a Welsh born Muslim assistant teacher, the 23 year old daughter of Pakistani immigrants, who was

suspended from her post as foreign language support worker in a Church of England run grammar school when she refused to remove her veil while giving lessons to eleven year olds if adult male colleagues were present. Azmi complained of her suspension to the relevant authorities, and an employment tribunal, while awarding her a small sum in compensation for “victimisation” through the manner of her suspension, denied her contention that she had been harassed or discriminated against on account of her religion. A UK Government Minister called for her “to be sacked”, charging her with denying children a full education by refusing to remove her veil, while the tribunal was still considering her complaint. Despite pleas from Muslim community leaders and a prominent Muslim MP to accept the tribunal’s ruling and her dismissal, or agree to comply with the school’s requirements that she afford pupils “face to face communication”, and despite having no public support among Muslims or non-Muslims in Britain, Azmi says she intends to appeal, as far as the European Court for Human Rights, to establish her right to wear the niqab in the classroom. For Azmi, the issue appears to be as politicised as her opponents have wished to make it: “Muslim women who wear the veil are not aliens,” she told the press. “Integration requires people like me to be in the workplace so people can see that we are not to be feared or mistrusted.” Prime Minister Blair denounced the Muslim facial covering as a “mark of separation” which he said caused discomfort to those outside the wearer’s own confessional community. “No one wants to say that people don’t have the right to do it,” Blair said. “That is to take it too far. But I think we need to confront this issue about how we integrate people properly into our society.” Soon the British and international press took up the issue of “the cloth wall”, the self-segregation of Muslim communities in Europe. Romano Prodi chimed in with “You can’t cover your face; you must be seen. This is common sense, I think. It is important for our society.” The publicity Azmi’s eccentric case has received, and the coincidence of its timing for Mr. Straw’s attack on veiling as an obstacle to communication, has led more than one journalist to see the Azmi affair as an anecdote of little importance cynically placed in the spotlight as part of a troubling stream of mounting Islamophobia. *The Guardian* reported (Oct 21, 2006, Vikram Dodd, *White pupils less tolerant, survey shows*) that while the Labour government appeared to be intent on blaming Muslim self-isolation for “the failure of integration”, a study they themselves commissioned had determined that white British adolescents were far more intolerant than British Muslim adolescents: “The findings turn on its head the current debate about integration, where a succession of cabinet ministers have told Muslims they must do more to fit in.” Jonathan Freedland’s *Guardian* editorial of October 18, **If this onslaught was about Jews, I’d be looking for my passport**: *Politicians and media have turned a debate about integration into an ugly drumbeat of hysteria against British Muslims*, speculated that British Muslims must be feeling “a sense of dread about switching on the radio or television, even about walking into a newsagents. What will they be saying about us today? Will we be under assault for the way we dress? Or the schools we go to, or the

mosques we build? Who will be on the front page: a terror suspect, a woman in a veil or, the best of both worlds, a veiled terror suspect?"

This round of the sensationalised integration debate revisits the alternatives to “the problem of integration” roughly corresponding to the British (multicultural) and Continental approaches. Earlier in September, *The Guardian* editorial by A Sivanandan (*Attacks on multicultural Britain pave the way for enforced assimilation: The backward cultural discourse of mainland Europe, in which difference is decried, is infecting our thinking*, Sept 13, 2006) blamed European influence for the failure of Britain’s pro-diversity policy:

Countries such as France, Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany are opposed to ethnic minorities having their own cultural expression - be it of dress (the veil), language or values. The problem in Britain is that the government has allowed these European preoccupations - which come out of totally different histories and struggles - to contaminate our debate. Assimilation was something that Britain consciously rejected in favour of integration 40 years ago. In the former Labour home secretary Roy Jenkins's classic definition, integration is "not a flattening process of assimilation but equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance".

But Sivanandan also recognised the real economic and social factors which have led to the failure – or some would say incomplete success – of British multiculturalism and its degradation into an ethnicism which, rather than stitch the cultural quilt, hardens social divisions and fosters competition among segregated groups:

But cultural diversity or cultural expression came not from government edict, but from the joint fight against racial discrimination - on the factory floor and in local communities - by Asians, African-Caribbeans and whites, creating unity in diversity. It was that unified struggle, across communities, ethnic groups, faiths and locales, that also led to the introduction of the government's anti-discrimination legislation in the Race Relations Acts of 1965, 1968 and 1976. And that understanding of multiculturalism, in the early 1970s, encouraged schools to teach children to respect each other's cultures and religions and celebrate each other's festivals.

But those very successes were instrumental in making multiculturalism government policy, and thereby institutionalising it. In the process, multiculturalism was stripped of its anti-racist roots and remit. It ceased to be an outcome of the struggle for equality emanating from

below, and became government policy imposed from above. And as the anti-racist component of the struggle ebbed, multiculturalism as policy began to degenerate into what I would term culturalism or ethnicism. It became part and parcel of a competitive fight for central and local government favours, and moved the struggle from the streets to the town halls.

- Also in October, 2006, Turkish novelist Orhan Pamuk was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature. In his native country, which aspires to join the European Union, Pamuk had recently fallen afoul of laws prohibiting insult to the nation, having given an interview in Switzerland deemed “defamatory of Turkishness” because he spoke of the Armenian genocide and complained that no one in Turkey but himself was willing to discuss it publicly. His prosecution, which was aborted due to a technicality, made headlines across Europe. The story was found to be particularly convenient for political camps opposing Turkey’s EU membership hopes, who chose to construe Pamuk’s prosecution through the lens of the “clash of civilisations” even though the trope of “Islam vs. the West” which powers that theme was not apparent in the case, which involved the Turkish state’s regulation of speech regarding its own imperial history. Outrage in Western Europe over Pamuk’s predicament seemed to replicate the most familiar debate of modern democracy and civil society, pitting the sanctity of freedom of expression against the tyranny of state censorship, but a twist in the story’s epilogue brought it out of that traditional frame and into the age of post-modern irony. On the same day that Europe’s premier cultural jury honoured Pamuk, the first Turk to receive the prize and an author of undisputed stature in the literary and academic spheres of Europe, the French parliament passed a law prohibiting the denial of the Armenian genocide, the first European law criminalising *négationnisme* that applies to any crimes against humanity other than those committed by Nazis and Axis regimes during the Second World War. President Chirac, whose party opposed the law but whose Assembly members preferred largely to be absent than to vote against it, deemed the result “more polemic than legal reality”.

Nine European countries currently have laws prohibiting Holocaust denial and revisionism, crimes punishable by incarceration and fines. In 1996, an attempt had been made in France to prosecute Bernard Lewis, an American intellectual and Harvard University Professor who enjoys enormous prestige in conservative and neoliberal US political circles, under the French *anti-négationnisme* laws in connection with his denial of the established factuality of the Armenian genocide in an interview in a French paper. At the time, the laws were confined very specifically to denial of Nazi crimes, and the tribunal, though persuaded by the plaintiff’s contentions regarding Lewis’ assertions, was obliged to content itself with issuing a rebuke to Lewis for practising history irresponsibly. Thirty historians from across the political spectrum, including Alain Finkielkraut, supported the effort to see Lewis

punished. Had the new law been then in force, Lewis might have been sentenced to prison (although one assumes he would not have ventured the criminal speech in the first place). While few respectable intellectuals, however devoted to free speech absolutism, have shed tears for that handful of revisionists, like Robert Faurisson and David Irving, who have been tried and convicted under laws prohibiting denial of Nazi crimes, the successful prosecution of an intellectual of the stature and influence of Bernard Lewis in France would undoubtedly cause a scandal as great if not greater than that caused by Pamuk's ordeal in Turkey, however odious almost everyone would deem the cynical, politically convenient denial of genocide Lewis ventured in the press to be. The new French law promises further complications, as it is now conceivable that historians of the early 20th century will be forced to choose between breaking Turkish or French law in their prose. Moreover, it engenders the embryo of a "list" of officially recognised historical crimes protected by the State from a form of insult that is the refusal to know about them and believe the work of historians; if the list grows, as lists of this kind will do, it risks casting everything that is not included, by implication, into the realm of the dubious, or relatively insignificant, and available for manipulation, distortion and denial for political or rhetorical convenience. Perhaps the most significant thing about the new French law, however, is that it suggests a growing acceptability of the regulation of expression, in defence of what European governments feel to be Europe's core values and principles, and an increased willingness to venture the suppression of speech domestically as a form of diplomacy as well as national and political self-portraiture.

The Clash Of Civilisations Genre

We increasingly experience the world not only through but as television. What is news is what's in the news; the culture of a territory is what is available for viewing on broadcasts reaching it. Critics from the centre as well the extremes of the European political spectrum have all conceded that media's function of representation rivals parliamentary representation for the dominant role in mediating between the State and the population, so that even traditional social democrats, conservatives and liberals conceive of the political and social sphere as something roughly equivalent to Medhi Belhaj Kacem's concept of a *démocratie médiatico-parlementaire*.

Assessing the performance of media thus has become inseparable from the judgment of the quality of our democracy itself. How well represented is the population of Europe? can only be determined with as much attention to media institutions as to elected governing bodies. Social exclusions, lack of adequate representation, are not only reflected but enacted by mass media. Not being seen on television, for people without vast resources and power, correlates closely with not being heard, in government, in universities, in the professions, in the judiciary, in all the halls of influence of democratic societies. Invisibility in the media is in itself perceived as a hardship, regardless of what it may indicate or cause in terms of real life, and repairing this erasure has become a progressive pursuit. Recognising oneself, one's concerns, represented sympathetically, non-stereotypically and realistically in the media is not simply a sign of inclusion but a fact of it, and can be an instrument of empowerment of the disadvantaged, discriminated against and isolated.

Thus the discontinuities which persist between the social reality in European countries and its representation in mass media, on television in particular, themselves constitute a social ill which has become the focus of proliferating media activist campaigns and scholarly study. More and more, the media is viewed as equally cause and symptom of social relations and a social relation itself of paramount importance. It is no longer possible to treat reality as largely the raw material and mass media the product derived from it and responsive to its evolutions. Immigration and integration are not simply topics which media must address more scrupulously as given objects but a process in which mass media is a powerful player, not merely charged with providing a depiction of "the mainstream" of culture and society but functioning as the principle artery and content of that stream and thus capable, virtually alone, of "naturalising" cultural practises, languages, customs, beliefs, products and people. Media similarly has the perilous power to de-naturalise and "other" people and things, and create a false and tendentious, idealised or nationalistic image of what is "native" and normative, against which artificial norms things and people can be designated alien, foreign, and disruptive arbitrarily.

Addressing the conjunction of immigration and media requires an approach from several angles simultaneously: media performance must be assessed with regard to its duty to serve immigrants and minority communities as audience without ghettoisation or segregation; its performance must be assessed with regard to its duty to represent immigrants and minority communities proportionally, accurately and without hostility or defamation, in all genres including news and documentary; performance must be assessed with regard to immigrant individuals' access to employment in media at all levels. Additionally, the conjuncture of media and migration also requires scrutiny with regard to the role media images – films and television - of destination countries play as impetus to migration, a “media effect” which has only very recently begun to be examined. Lastly, performance must also be assessed with regard to media's role in creating immigrants, immigration, and the “challenge” it and they pose, and in defining and shaping that to which the “challenge” is posed, as themes and active concepts in public discourse.

The “Question of Integration” is a media product as well as a political issue, and the two are indeed inextricable. The formulation of the question will not only have its impact on immigrants and minorities, their comfort, safety, opportunities, and prospects for prospering in their adopted communities, but on the public understanding of what characterises and defines “our culture” into which those immigrants are to be absorbed without being obliterated. The mass media has as great a responsibility to accuracy with regard to the creation and description of the dominant culture - the portrait of the beach onto which these “waves” of newness roll - as it has to refrain from distorting and sensationalising the phenomena associated with and arising from the movements of people across borders. The problem of integration as a concept shaped and disseminated by political discourse can unfortunately serve as a receptacle of all the social ills and political failures politicians and policy makers wish to avoid addressing the roots of in the dominant culture. When the focus is on the – usually imagined as ‘failed’ or disrupted – integration of immigrants, that society of which the immigrants represent a new undigested factor is by implication redeemed from every previously existing conflict and shortcoming, and takes on an illusion of prior integrity, wholeness, and harmony. It may also be drained of its own intrinsic diversity, vibrancy, multicultural past, and tendency to change, to be presented as an idealised monolith of hoary traditions and essential absolutes rocked and ruined by hostile invasions of difference. Rifts are magically healed, competition disguised, historical transformations simplified, and chronic deep conflicts ignored as the origin and essence of conflict and change is displaced onto new arrivals and portrayed as originating with their advent. Among the duties of mass media is to avoid this temptation to load the phenomenon of immigration and immigrants with all the challenges and problems – violence, poverty, unemployment, political disaffection, religious extremism, economic inequality – of the society itself, problems which have

not originated with immigrants but have deep roots in the dominant culture and society. The tendency in mass media – and this is nothing new - is in fact to couple the question of immigration to every social ill, including drug and alcohol abuse, delinquency, misogyny, domestic violence, and homelessness, with the dangerous double result of demonising immigrants and avoiding inquiry into the real causes of social problems which afflict populations both recently arrived and those deriving from communities settled for centuries.

Mass media stands automatically in the role not of publicist but embodiment of the existing culture, creating its mainstream and its subsidiary canals, and defining what lies outside it. Like the United Nations, it enjoys a power to grant recognition, and thus the status of belonging, or withhold it. The welcome mass media extends to actual immigrants is not only a question of portrayals of diverse ethnic characters or the responsible and accurate handling of reportage of immigration facts and events involving immigrant individuals and communities. There lies beneath this the media's fundamental shaping of "immigrants and immigration" as an issue, and by implication, the definition and delineation of the "native" society. How mass media defines and narrates immigrants and immigration involves more than the production of a record of a social process outside the media, but is an important, even dominant, aspect of that social process, carrying out the constant concoction of the common, normative, familiar, indigenous, acceptable, which are not eternal principles but continuously renovated by global exchange of which the movement of people is only one aspect and not, as often mass media seems to imply, usually the most culturally transformative in the European context.

While various studies of immigration and media conducted by sociology departments of European universities detect positive trends in media handling of and attention to previously invisible European populations and communities, most conclude, and recent events seem to confirm, that the question of "immigration" and "integration" is increasingly subsumed in mass media newsproduct under the general theme initiated on the American political scene of the "clash of civilisations". This frame of reference exerts a magnetic pull on news stories and fictional product alike. Even while European dramas and comedies, such as the BBC's popular and widely exported *Goodness Gracious Me* or the mini-series *White Teeth*, have steadily opened the spectacular world to frequent, complex, sympathetic, realistic and memorable representations of immigrant and minority characters, and narrated the experience of immigration and integration as aspects of life with admirable depth, humour and sensitivity, this considerable progress in terms of bringing the diversity of the fictional demography closer to the diversity of European reality has remained somehow apart from the mass media's presentation of immigration and integration as themes and concepts themselves. Much like individuals, who tend to exclude all ideas and feelings about their own - gay, Muslim, Jewish, American, French, Iranian - friends and acquaintances when reverting to generalising discussions of gays,

Muslims, Jews, etc – broadcasters display the same tendency to compartmentalise, maintaining a wall between their own growing inclusion (of characters, of creative personnel, of languages, of topics) and the rigid formula in which the “issues” of “migration” and “diversity” as themes and problems are imagined and presented.

At present, the migration/integration “debate” is trapped in the formula “clash of civilisations”, becoming inextricably entangled with the “war on terror”, and has been fixed there more rootedly through each of a series of “events” and “crises”, from the “asylum seekers” at Dover, the *sans papiers* movement in France, the hijab conflict in France, the assassination of Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands, through the Danish cartoons and the sudden furore about illegal migrant workers in the United States. The very notion of an immigration problem, to which European policy must respond, is embedded in this paradigm, offered by politicians and dutifully maintained by media, both major and minor. Far more attention is paid, for example, in French mass media news to the immigrant groups and anecdotes which can be used to elaborate this theme of “civilisational clash” than to, for example, the severe economic problems arising in many villages in the French countryside alongside the influx of well to do British retirees, immigrants and second home owners. Local newspapers may now and then examine this particular subset of immigration for its negative effects on established communities: driving up property prices beyond the reach of populations many generations resident, the closure of small business and the non-sustainability of services because of the British reluctance to integrate, to learn the local language, to patronise local merchants and to send children to local schools, all resulting in what local residents often refer to as devastation of their once thriving communities and their transformation from locales of traditional country life into holiday resorts. But the dark side of this immigration, driven by the UK’s long property boom, is not a motif of “The Immigration Question” as it is framed by national media in France. It is not because the stories lack opportunities for emotional appeal, or because they don’t fit in with existing common themes of the dilemmas of modernity. Journalists could tell the story of how church bells which rang on a schedule for centuries have ceased to toll on summer nights in villages in Provence and Gascony because homeowners from a foreign country and culture complain of disturbed sleep. Such poignant stories would be justified by factuality. This of course is far from a complete portrait of the phenomenon of British retirement and holiday home buying in France. But this existing tension – this immigration “problem” as it is seen from the point of view of some established communities – is not sensationalised in the French press. Similarly, when the topic of “immigration” and “integration” is introduced in the British press, it is rare indeed for the ensuing story to speak of British expatriates living abroad, although the number of native Britons living outside the UK is greater than the number of foreign born UK residents. Such migration is viewed perhaps as fundamentally benign, not a mass phenomenon but a collection of individual cases which cannot even be spoken about en masse, while the immigration of working

people and those seeking asylum in rich countries is perceived as, if not malign entirely, at least a “problem” requiring active solution on the part of State and other institutions. It goes without saying that when Immigration is raised as an issue in French or British press it is not the movements of French and British born people who will be the protagonists, but a fungible population of others imagined to bring social upheavals, and a persistent set of dilemmas and difficulties assumed to be caused by certain people (immigrants seeking work) to other people (established populations of rich countries), whose possible solutions and remedies are confined to actions of the latter on, to, against the former. It is not infrequent to see on British “house porn” shows stories of striving English couples renovating farm houses in Tuscany or transforming small Chateaux into hotels in Provence, stories only naturally focussing on their efforts, successes and setbacks, views of locals, acquisition of language, etc.. The model of such common immigrant tales, which appear in vignettes in films and television series and reality programmes, seem more owing to the inspiration of Karen Blixen on the Velt with her china tea service and linen napkins than it resembles the distant, generalising, sensationalised or coldly impersonal manner in which the journeys of “immigrants” labelled as such, journeys often dangerous, sometimes fatal, of extracommunity workers into Europe are commonly reported and recounted in both documentary and fiction. The active role of work-seeking, non European immigrants in the integration process, their individual and collective agency in the creation of positive outcomes, their point of view as protagonists of integration but also of full lives with economic, social and personal goals – all aspects easily and naturally elaborated in stories of moneyed European entrepreneurial or professional expatriates - are often obscured in media treatment of poor arrivals. “Immigrants”, as a vague social category, are instead most often portrayed as passive embodiments of a “problem,” to manage which measures are to be taken by others who possess all the choices, knowledge and power.

While anti-immigration rhetoric is a constant drone of hostility and inflammatory myth, sincere advocacy of the well being of immigrants and interest in immigrant lives with which much media product replies to alarmism can feed the same framework with patronising and generalisations. This formulation of “immigrants” as a discrete issue and objectified population, about which rabid xenophobes argue with sympathetic experts and advocates, usually to the exclusion of immigrant voices, is often then used to absorb and skew portrayals and treatment of established, native born minority communities whose numbers new immigrants increase. The media’s tendency to objectify certain immigrants who fit certain patterns and to portray them through the eyes of an equally fictionalised and homogenised “native type” which is construed to exclude the considerable number of European natives with non European ancestry contributes above all to the ability of cynical political forces to deploy the idea of Immigration itself as a veil for racism, a distraction from pressing social issues, a mode of dividing populations who are in fact significantly

integrated into their adopted societies, and a tool for manipulation and the degradation of public political discourse.

The questions of immigration and integration as themes, success and failure, are formed in such a way as to exclude cases like British or German middle and upper middle class movement to southern France, Greek Islands, or the Spanish coastline and to conform to the themes which produce a homogenised and harmonious Europe, or Western Europe in some cases, which does not really exist, imagined besieged and invaded by people whose presumed cultural difference threatens everything from disruption of ways of life and fall of local living standard to the destruction of democracy itself. This frame of the “clash of civilisations” into which the question of immigrants and immigration to Europe is increasingly fit needs to be challenged.

Media Effects

Among the most controversial issues of media studies in universities as well as among professionals and the public are the actual power of media 'events' and representation to affect the behaviour and thoughts of its consumers, the ways in which that power is realised, and the limits of that power. On one end of the spectrum of assumptions on this matter cluster varied groups, industries and social sectors who, while in agreement on little else, share an almost religious faith in the ability of the major media to directly dictate social and political attitudes, shape ideas, and incite actions, for good and for ill equally; these include advertisers, who invest billions yearly in the belief that cunningly crafted messages can act in predictable ways upon large groups of viewers, certain schools of cinema and media theorists in academia, who take for granted that the act of consuming edited moving picture with sound is a process of indoctrination and a mechanism for the creation of subjectivities, and a new crop of media activist groups (e.g. Medialens, Mediachannel, Medialupe, FAIR, Project Censored) who concentrate their efforts to impact government and public policy – to foster environmental conservation, to oppose war, to support education funding, to protect minority rights, etc – in attempts to exert their influence on the media's treatment and representation of these issues as an ends rather than merely one means. These varied groups share an operative conviction that there is only one way to the public consciousness and it is through major media; these groups see media as effectively a monopoly provider of culture and belief in modern democracies, and see its role principally to deceive the public about reality for the benefit of powerful elites in business and government.

On the other end of the spectrum of views are situated most media professionals, political militants, and a growing number of sociologists who view this notion of a monolithic media culture tyrannically shaping social life, fashions and feelings with greater scepticism and who seek to better understand how it is that media does influence attitudes and opinions and within what limits this influence is exercised.

In past research th[e] relationship [between newsproduct and audience] has been analysed from various theoretical perspectives. Some have seen news content as essentially ideological and as having the power to limit and structure audience belief (Glasgow Media Group 1976, 1980, Philo 1990, Herman and Chomsky 1998). Others have seen the news as a constant recurrence of routinised journalistic practice (Rock 1973, Enzensberger 1974). Still others have seen news content as primarily directed by commercial criteria, based on assumptions about what audiences 'really' want to watch (Stone, 2000). There is also a strong current in contemporary research which suggests that media are engaged in the mass production of social ignorance. This is well

expressed in the title of Danny Schechter's *The More You Watch The Less You Know* (1998)

- (*Media Coverage of the Developing World*, Glasgow Media Unit)

Can we expect the mainstream European media to reflect some of the concerns and issues discussed here in their reports on Islam and their analyses of Muslim societies? There are already journalists in both the print and electronic media who display a commendable degree of sensitivity in their writings and broadcasts on Islam and Muslims. However, they are few and far between. If bodies such as the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) organise workshops and courses for journalists and broadcasters, it is quite conceivable that many more will develop a deeper understanding of the complexities prevailing within the *Ummah*.

However, can organisations associated with media workers by themselves bring about a change to the European mindset when other stakeholders may have their own agenda? Perhaps there are political and economic elites who may regard better understanding of, and more empathy with, the Muslim position on the part of Europeans as detrimental to their hegemonic designs. Or, are European elites moving away from the politics and economics of hegemony, which in any case is Washington helmed, and becoming more open to reconciliation and bridge building with the Muslim world?

- *Dr. Chandra Muzaffar, President, International Movement for a Just World (JUST), speaking at the Asia-Pacific and Europe Media Dialogue, September 2006 in Paris*

Us and Them: Waterfront Paradise and Tidal Wave

The British media policy group, Third World and Environment Broadcasting Trust, (3WE) concluded a study of programming policy regarding Third World themes in 2000. Thirty eight senior broadcasters, commissioning editors and programme makers were interviewed. The study concluded that “audience demand” was the overriding rationale for programming choices and that, according to the professionals in decision-making positions, the audience British broadcasters sought was not interested in factual programmes about the developing world. “Programme editors are driven by audience interest,” journalist George Alagiah of the BBC explained, “but this can lead to a fixation with home, leisure and consumer items instead of the broader agenda.” Steve Hewlett, Carleton Television Programme Director concurred, “I know from past experience that programmes about the developing world don’t bring in the audiences. They’re not about us, and they’re not usually about things we can do anything about.”

Over the past decade, the Media Unit of the Sociology department at Glasgow University conducted a series of studies of the British media coverage of the developing world. If one assumes that attitudes toward immigrants on the part of indigenous European populations can be at least in part influenced by those populations’ information and understanding of the countries and cultures from which immigrants come, improving the accuracy and depth of the perception of the developing world inculcated by television – for most Europeans, the sole source of information on the subject – would be one area for media to work in the service of integration and cross cultural sensitivity.

The Glasgow Media Group’s studies of the representation of the developing world in media produced the following conclusions:

1. That the decision made by broadcasters (on commercial criteria) about what viewers would desire to watch have in the long run produced very negative responses in TV audiences towards the developing world.
2. That audiences are misinformed about the developing world because of the low level of explanations and context which is given in television reporting and because some explanations which are present are partial and informed by what might be termed ‘post-colonial beliefs’.
3. That a change in the quality of explanation which is given can radically alter both attitudes to the developing world and the level of audience interest in the subject.

According to a report by Jennie Stone for 3WE, factual programming about the developing world declined 50% between 1989 and 1999 but coverage of disasters had increased by 5%. The Glasgow Media Group's study of the same period concluded that:

when the developing world is featured on the news a high proportion of the coverage related to war, conflict, terrorism and disasters....Much of the remaining coverage is given over either to sport or to visits by westerners to developing countries. For example, in our sample the Bahamas were in the news because Mick Jagger and Gerry Hall had visited and some countries were featured simply because Richard Branson's balloon had floated over them

Glasgow Media Unit recognised BBC's Newsnight as among the rare exceptions, featuring coverage of the political and economic news from the developing world, but on British television overall, representations of the regions of the world from which many work seeking and asylum seeking immigrants come were found to be dominated by "dramatic and negative images". "So it is not surprising that viewers perceive the developing world to be not much more than a series of catastrophes." The implicit connection made between the inhabitants of the developing world and the upheaval which is the constant feature of its representation in the news was found to be occasionally made explicit: "On ITN the people of Africa were compared to the topography of the landscape which they inhabited. The volcanoes were described as being 'far more predicable than the people they watch over'" It is not a great leap to suppose that when the press and television news evoke immigrant populations as "waves" and "floods" from Asia, South America, the Middle East and Africa, such imagery exploits pre-existing conceptions of the protagonists of migration derived from the proliferation of representations of the developing world in the moods of chaos, destruction, disorder and calamity, and the near total absence of any other representations of these locales and populations.

Lack of context and explanation in reporting even the often extensively covered disasters (earthquakes, wars, and the like) leave European audiences with an impression of those effected by the series of cataclysms as helpless, primitive, indistinguishable people inhabiting a vast undifferentiated backward wilderness outside the developed world, a landscape characterised not by complex political, economic and social features but buffeted by a kind of human weather as unpredictable and irrational as the natural disasters which seem perpetually to be troubling the world beyond Fortress Europe and North America, whose vague and disquieting idea is conjured by terms like "ethnic hatreds" and "tribal passions":

In a pilot for the DFID research I asked a focus group what image came into their minds when they heard the word 'tribe'. They replied that it would be people with grass skirts and spears standing in front of huts. At the end of that group meeting I explained to them something of the history of Rwanda and commented that the Hutu military regime in 1994 had killed all opposition groups including moderate Hutus, Belgium nationals and soldiers with the UN as well as the Tutsi population. In Butare, a city in the south of the city which was known for its tolerance and liberalism the Hutu students and lecturers at the University were killed because they were assumed to be in opposition to the Hutu government. One woman in the focus group commented 'Oh you don't think of them as having universities'

A focus group of British 15 year olds was asked about travel programmes featuring India as a holiday destination:

1st: Not on India.

2nd: No one goes there so why do they want to?

3rd: It is not a popular tourist attraction because in India they have always got problems.

2nd: It would be a holiday nightmare if someone went to India. The houses are full of bugs.

Moderator: So it doesn't sounds appealing to go there?

2nd: The swimming pools are full of cockroaches and stuff.

3rd: There is always terrorists over there anyway.

And on the topic of third world debt:

Moderator: Does anybody know anything about or has seen anything on TV about the debt campaign?

1st: The what?

2nd: Yes.

Moderator: Removal of third world debt.

1st: No.

3rd: Is it 50p a month and you can help them?

2nd: We pay them and they don't pay us back.

4th: You get to help a child and all that stuff.

5th: Pay 50p a child.

2nd: Do they owe us?

6th: They owe us twice the amount.

2nd: We will never get it back.

1st: They haven't even got an economy.

According to the Glasgow studies, such impressions, given by television, were only resisted by subjects who had other, non-mass media sources of information about the developing world. One subject in the study's low income focus group said:

I do some voluntary work for Oxfam so I hear a lot about things from there. I mean, you wouldn't believe half of what is going, really positive things, I mean that you wouldn't hear about anywhere else. I watch the news sometimes and think oh yeah, here we go again, why don't you tell us about the people who are trying to change things and the huge advances that are being made.

The Glasgow group also found that the British audience tended to see Africa as one country, and its people as unable to govern themselves due to lack of education.

This association of the lands of origin of many immigrants with catastrophes from which mass flight is only to be expected may go some distance to explaining why members of the long established British population tend to make little distinction between asylum-seeking refugees and other immigrants to Britain. The British press typically divides immigrants between the forgivable minority who is running for their lives from fiendish regimes and the nefarious kind who pretend to do so but are instead "seeking the good life" (which is suspect, as it is implied it is had, by trickery, at the expense of hardworking British citizens). The figure of the "bogus", criminal "asylum-seeker" – initially from Central Europe or the Balkans- began to be a recurring theme of the tabloid press in Britain at the end of the 1990s. A report by the Information Centre About Asylum and Refugees in the UK (ICAR), *Media Images, Community Impact*, (2004) affirmed that, while it is notoriously difficult to establish causal relations between news items or television programmes and audience actions, "inaccurate and unbalanced reporting is commonly suspected by refugee support agencies, community groups, local authorities, the police and researchers to contribute to racist attacks on asylum seekers and refugees and to being a barrier to integration because of the feelings of insecurity and isolation which it engenders" in new arrivals. "We have been told," one refugee agency worker said, "that a negative article one day equates to a fist in the face the following day."

The ICAR report, examining asylum treated in the press, remarked a peak week during its monitoring period in 2003 in which fifty six items on asylum seekers and asylum policy appeared in a sample of seventeen daily and weekly British papers. This stream of pieces, as in other weeks monitored, was overwhelmingly unsympathetic to asylum seekers, overwhelming focussed on their criminality and dishonesty, on the costs of the asylum process to the public treasury, and other issues which tend to the incitement of public ire and hostility. It was in fact the perception

that the British media, and the tabloid press especially, was stoking dangerous flames with its asylum coverage and openly xenophobic rhetoric, whose effects could be seen in the alarming rise in BNP popularity and riots in the first years of the 21st century, that inspired the opening of a British discourse on speech-regulation which merely a decade before would have seemed to represent steps backward in the progression of civil liberties.

Liberty vs. Security In The Realm Of Speech

Enlightenment and democracy, the core values and principles, the worldview, the secular religion of modern Europe, has the distinction as a belief system of being awe-inspiringly clear in theory and the muddiest possible thing imaginable in practise. The principles – liberty, equality, solidarity, rationality, self-government, self-determination - form a constellation of gorgeous crystal globes each serenely in orbit around the body politic but each containing a chaotic mini universe of its own and fixed on a path inevitably colliding with another. Nothing could be simpler and less controversial than a State declaring its duty and determination to honour and guard an individual's inalienable right to free expression and freedom of worship, to eradicate racism and protect its victims, to guarantee all individuals equality before the law, and nothing could be more difficult even to begin to plot pragmatic strategies to achieve. Every positive individual civil rights guarantee is haunted by the potential infringement of another, and every recognition of community identities, historically determined debilities and advantages, or socially functioning markers of difference implies an infringement on the individual's pristine citizen individuality. Individuality is itself the seed of the aporia at the heart of the system it creates: individuality is something possessed equally by all individuals but no two individualities are alike. Each is a busy intersection of bonds and belongings, determinations and connections, as well as a self-determining agency. Where every citizen does not have equal power, equal abilities, and equal resources, and where competition and exchange are the fundamental organising principles of the social formation, the work of practical, lived equality is not one of recognition but laborious and incessant construction, in which the State must participate along with the governed.

On the legal front, ethnic difference and collective identities have steadily been recognised as social facts pertinent to lawmaking and to the ever vexed question of interpreting public speech, media product and art in a courtroom.

The role of the State in protecting its citizens as members of communities and groups from aggressions carried out via media has been spotlighted in the past few years, closely associated the larger issue of facilitating integration.

In April 2006, for the Hate Speech Conference/Panel of Diplomats in Budapest, Ambassador Yves Doutriaux, France's permanent representative to the OSCE, taking off from the difference between the American and European approaches, summed up the state of the question and offered his recommendations this way:

1- The differing views between the US and most Western-European Countries as regards the limits of freedom of speech are not new:

- *Principle of the absence of any limits on freedom of speech (First Amendment to the US Constitution) since the Congress cannot legislate in this field;*
- *Guarantee of freedom of speech “within the framework of the law” (Declaration of the Rights of the Man and of the Citizen, 1789, Article 11): “The free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man. Every citizen may, accordingly, speak, write, and print with freedom, but shall be responsible for such abuses of this freedom as shall be defined by law”. In fact, the French law on the press of 1881 provides that printing and publishing are free while concurrently setting various limits associated with the right of other media and means of expression;*
- *New limitations on freedom of speech: prohibition of the apology for and denial of crimes against humanity; prohibition of the provocation of acts of terrorism (e.g. British law on the glorification of terrorism); prohibition of incitement to discrimination, hatred or violence against a person or a group of people on the grounds of religion, ethnic origin or race;*
- *Internet: responsibility of service providers granting access to contents in certain conditions (e.g. the Yahoo case with contradictory decisions by the French and American courts). According to a French tribunal acting upon request of a human rights NGO, Yahoo had to bear responsibility for the content of a website selling prohibited neo-nazi material; subsequently, Yahoo got a contradictory court decision in the USA. In the end, Yahoo agreed to cooperate with the French decision and suspended the website concerned;*
- *Satellite TV: Banning by France of Al Manar, (a Lebanese Broadcasting TV Station run by Hezbollah), retransmitted by EUTELSAT. Al Manar broadcasts an anti-semitic soap opera, TV games promoting suicide bombings and the killing of Jews. A few days later, the US adopted the same measure but for different reasons (Hezbollah is listed as a terrorist organization);*
- *The global and trans-border character of numerous media enhances the different legal approaches taken by the US and Europe (e.g. Yahoo case).*

2- However, Europeans and Americans both support the principle of freedom of the press in the OSCE area

- *One of the principles of the Helsinki Decalogue;*
- *Support for the activities of the Office Of Media Freedom;*

- *Joint Assessment of threats against journalists, the independent press, and internet access in numerous OSCE countries;*

3- Despite the differences in our approach to law, Europeans and Americans are seeking a common approach to the question of the coexistence of freedom of the press and the fight against intolerance

- *The topic of the 'role played by the media' (negative /positive) in the fight against anti-Semitism, racism and all forms of discrimination topped the agenda at the OSCE conferences in Berlin, Paris, Brussels and Cordoba. The Paris Conference (June 2004) on the internet, racism and anti-Semitism made possible a real US-European debate on the problem of anti-Semitic and racist messages on the internet.*

Despite the differences in legal approaches, consensus has come to light in some areas:

- *Common attachment to freedom of the media and the internet. We have to make sure that there is no abuse from countries less favourable to freedom of the media, which might be tempted to use the alibi of the fight against racism to limit internet access, or close down newspapers;*
- *Agreement to encourage the monitoring by the civil society of racist and anti-Semitic websites- e.g. the experience of the international network on cyber hate (INACH) which has established co-operation with the ODIHR (training NGOs to monitor in Central and Eastern European countries; aiming at establishing complaints bureaux about hate speech on the internet). Role of service providers (code of conduct; cooperation with human rights NGO and law enforcement agencies...);*
- *Agreement on action with regard to education and protection of children. The role of the school and of parents in informing them (and warning them) about racist websites;*
- *Law enforcement agencies should investigate and fully prosecute violence and criminal acts of violence motivated by racist, xenophobic, anti-Semitic or other related sites on the internet. One should notice that, in spite of the first amendment, there is a US jurisprudence that states that when there is a direct threat on persons or a group of persons, the author of these threatening messages could be sentenced;*
- *The specific issue of the terrorist use of internet has been dealt with in the OSCE: a workshop (last fall) discussed practical recommendations such as*

exchange of information and monitoring of terrorist messages, websites; intelligence, police and judiciary cooperation in this regard.

4- As to the controversial publication of the caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed, I have noticed similar reactions in Washington and Paris:

- Attachment to freedom of the press / denunciation of violence against embassies and persons in certain Muslim countries;*

- But also critical assessment of the publication of the caricatures.*

Governments should have free speech. As Haraszti puts it in his last report: "it is perhaps necessary for governments to distance themselves from the publishers of the cartoons". It is exactly what the French government stated: the French government said that it is not appropriate, nor accurate to associate Muslims or prophet Mohamed with terrorists. This biased message is in contradiction to what the international community agreed upon when the UN Security Council stated in the aftermath of 9-11 that no specific religion should be considered "terrorist";

- Appeal to the "responsibility" of the media. Free speech doesn't mean that media and journalists would not bear the responsibility for what they print or broadcast. In the French media, we have had a real debate between those who decided not to publish the cartoons (considered as bad taste, provocative..) or those who chose the opposite option; experience of press councils (UK), professional code of deontology;*

- Promoting dialogue with the Muslim community both in Europe and with Muslim states; there is no clash of civilisation but a clash in respective knowledge of each other; there are gaps between the reactions of westerners and Muslims ; so that it a confidence building measure to promote exchanges of views, two-way street dialogue between :*

- NGOs, journalists from Europe and Muslim states;*

- European governments and their national Muslim communities (French example of the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman);*

- European and Arab governments (Euro-Med framework, OSCE and its Mediterranean partners).*

5- Proposals to the OSCE

OSCE is unique in this debate free press / fight against intolerance because it has

i. instruments :

- *an Office for Freedom of Media;*
- *an Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights with a unit against intolerance and discriminations;*
- *personal envoys on Islamophobia, anti-Semitism and against other forms of intolerance.*

ii. commitments and standards : free press, freedom of religion, fight against intolerance

iii. unique membership that includes Muslim countries and Muslim partners.

Because of this uniqueness, OSCE is well placed to try to set up sort of informal guidelines that would enlighten governments, and civil societies on this apparent contradiction between free press / fight against intolerance (it is an apparent contradiction because one could state that free press could be the best guarantor to knowledge and respect that "others" deserve).

So I would set a conclave where I would seclude the representative of the office for freedom of media, the director of the ODIHR and the three personal envoys against intolerance. They won't be allowed to leave before, emitting a white smoke, they announced that they had reached an agreement on such an informal guideline for free press/mutual respect compatibility.

"There is no clash of civilisation," the Ambassador declared; the underlying problem, which can give rise to events like the "cartoon crisis" or permit demagogues to skew the practise of democratic politics and stigmatise European citizens and residents, is one of inadequate communication.

It remains unclear whether hate speech prohibition is effective in achieving the ultimate goal of nurturing dialogue, or if it is too great an encroachment on freedom of expression in practise and/or too likely to backfire, by aggravating animosities, to suffice for the focus of policy directed at a encouraging more constructive and safer public discourse. Hate speech prosecutions have historically been rarely successful; furthermore, while the enactment of hate speech legislation is often in itself, even if never employed, a powerful gesture of concern and goodwill on the part of a government for a segment of its population feeling vulnerable and ill-used, which can in itself breed trust and grant reassurance to communities who may view such laws as demonstrations of earnest commitment to their security and dignity, the tendency for governments and courts to act with bias in enforcing the whole range of speech suppressing laws, from ancient blasphemy statutes to prohibitions on incitement to violence, means that such laws may become themselves instruments of the very discrimination and inequality they are written to combat. As opportunities

for the establishment of a record of “double standards” in application, with attacks on some minorities or communities more zealously policed than others, the use or non-use of hate speech laws may as easily become occasions for the aggravation of the feelings of exclusion, resentment and fear in the communities they are designed to comfort and protect as means of alleviating the anxiety of minorities facing the hostility of more powerful groups or under verbal attack. Groups with greater influence or better organised representative bodies will inevitably be able to make use of such laws more often and more successfully than others. The tensions and social polarisations bred by the same inequalities feeding the problem could be exacerbated at the newly expanded “site” of the proposed remedy.

Law Professor T. Mc Gonagle of the Institute for Information Law at the University of Amsterdam wrote (“Distinguishing Freedom of Expression From Hate Speech,” 7 November 2001, *Metro Éireann*):

A key, if under-reported, issue discussed at the recent World Conference Against Racism was the question of regulating “hate speech” – an umbrella term covering all kinds of racist and other identity-based forms of abusive expression. The question is highly controversial and of direct relevance to the media as well as to government policy-makers.

Under international law, protection is generally granted even to forms of expression that are offensive, shocking or disturbing to either the State or any section of society. This fundamental precept is considered to be a sine qua non of democracy. The only contentious question concerns the fixing of the ne plus ultra of protected speech; the legal trammelling of the vigorous discourse on which democracy depends.

Scepticism concerning the effectiveness of laws aimed at restricting hate speech is prevalent among advocates of freedom of expression. It is often argued – cogently – that the potential for abuse of such laws by State authorities outweighs their potential benefits.

In their recent Joint Statement on Racism and the Media, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, insisted that:

“3 Any civil, criminal or administrative law measures that constitute an interference with freedom of expression must be provided by law, serve a legitimate aim as set out in international law and be necessary to achieve that aim. This implies that any such measures are clearly and narrowly defined, are applied by a body which is independent of political, commercial or other unwarranted influences and in a manner which is neither arbitrary nor

discriminatory, and are subject to adequate standards against abuse, including the right of access to an independent court or tribunal.”

The limited number of permissible restrictions on freedom of expression are clearly enumerated in the various international human rights instruments. Of greatest relevance, perhaps, for present purposes is the denial of protection to “any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence” (Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).

The mandatory provisions of Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination are also of instructive value when examining the interaction between freedom of expression and the elimination of racism. These provisions enjoin States Parties to the Convention to, inter alia, “declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin....”

Despite the apparent symbiosis between freedom of expression and anti-racism on paper, international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies have regularly spurned the limited opportunities that have arisen for lengthy analysis of their compatibility with one another. Greater elucidation of this interface – which is actually quite problematic – can only come from the application of existing legal norms.

The policy preoccupations so manifest on the international scene are also replicated at the national level. The Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act, 1989, is the primary statute that addresses relevant issues in Ireland, but its shortcomings have been the subject of sustained criticism from anti-racism groups and others. Only a handful of prosecutions have been brought under the Act since its introduction and none of these – ultimately – proved successful. These statistics prompted the Minister for Justice to announce a comprehensive review of the legislation in September of last year, but as of yet, there has been scant evidence (if any!) of consultation with interested parties in this connection. The inefficacy of the Act has also led to it being described on these pages as a “toothless bulldog”. This description is warranted.

However, without seeking to diminish in any way the social imperative of eliminating racism, it must be stated that the proposed revamping of the Act ought to be mindful of the potentially adverse effects any new and aggressive wording could have on the right to freedom of expression. The uninhibited exercise of the right to freedom of expression can allow it to play a crucial role in the furtherance of anti-racism strategies. Only when there is a direct and incontrovertible nexus between particular

forms of expression and actual harm or distress, should there be contemplation of curbing or, a fortiori, sanctioning, that expression.

Although racism - in all of its distasteful hues - is anathema to advocates of human rights, the objective of promoting equality and non-discrimination must not be allowed to ride roughshod over the right to freedom of expression. Rather, a considered balancing of these interests is what is required. Although these rights do, on occasion, find themselves at cross-purposes with one another, there nonetheless exists a real potential for synergic interaction between them in the shared struggle against racism.

Naturally media organisations will resist the imposition of restrictive laws sometimes unduly favoured by lawmakers (fashioning laws are, after all, their *métier*, and a new law is often the most convenient way to take a political position or appear to be earnestly responding to a crisis) and prefer to develop self-monitored codes of conduct, quasi-governmental advisory bodies, relations with media-focussed NGOs, and to deal with the need for vigilance against provocation and offence within the media industry and profession in dialogue with the audience, whose role as ultimate regulator of media the State prefers partially to usurp. Media organisations have traditionally believed, with good reason, that the enrichment of controversy and variety in programmes and products and the deliberate effort to deliver as great a diversity as possible in points of view – proliferating mutually contradictory extremes in competition, rather than homogenising available product to some rough centre of acceptability which excludes a great deal – is the rockier but in the long term only passable road to the triple destination: the permanent safeguarding of media liberty (an indispensable feature of a democratic and “open” society), protecting people and groups against campaigns of demonisation, vilification, misrepresentation and hate, and protecting the public at large from incendiary and debilitating untruths about, and ignorance of, themselves and their neighbours. The trade-off confronted by media producers and consumers facing the ever developing realm of hate speech prohibition and content regulation is that familiar choice between liberty or security, often posed, as in this case, to disguise the ways in which each are necessary to and serve the other. Cynical and provocative speech about a given minority is impossible to completely suppress and is indeed dangerous, but far less so when members of the minority in question have ample access to respond and offer a competing message and a vivid self-presentation. Again the issue turns to necessity of ensuring equality – of access, of the means of delivering messages and participating in debate. The gavel and gag is not the only, nor necessarily the most efficacious, way to prevent ill-intentioned bigots and manipulators from sowing division and hate. The effort to eliminate bigotry, prejudice and exclusion cannot succeed solely by silencing what is objectionable; it must also encourage the expression and the dissemination of the existing variety of opinions and experiences. A media which included more rather than fewer “extremes”, passionate statements, eccentric viewpoints, from every possible quarter and angle, allowing equal access

and participation to name-callers and name-called of all stripes, might very well outperform a timid and carefully (self) policed media from which controversy is banned and in which enforced politeness leads to the impression of false consensus. Establishing an ever more insipid “official mainstream” which reflected nothing but the broadcaster’s anxiety not to upset may send dissent and conflict underground, allowing those with greatest access and influence to slant the entire picture of the world in subtle ways without fear of challenge or rebuttal. Achieving the diversity which alone can really disarm, by contradicting and drowning, pernicious messages, is a larger task, involving support for the development of new technologies and strategies for facilitating user and producer access, than content interpretation and regulation can accomplish alone.

The internet, by far the least restricted of all media, offers the salubrious example; while focus has been trained – often in a distorting and alarmist way, to urge regulation and control - on the pernicious elements (neo-Nazis, ultra right wing nationalists, terrorist groups, extreme pornography, scam artists, bogus news providers) which can utilise the internet and be found there by users who would stumble across such matter nowhere else on earth, the reality of the internet is that it is already a marvel of globalised diversity where the kind of dialogue Ambassador Doutriaux is hoping to nourish in the corridors of government and major media institutions is already happening, where European users can read of daily life in Saudi Arabia or Iraq or Peru as recounted on weblogs, the indymedia network, newsgroups, and thousands of online magazines, exchange ideas, fight, and find information never reported on television or in the daily papers, and which has developed as a massive hydra of rebuttal, as well as supplement, to the “mainstream” media.

Mass media outfits’ concern for audience satisfaction, license-imposed obligations, professional codes of conduct, oversight and regulation, combine to guarantee that little, if any, prosecutable hate speech is or will ever be broadcast on television in Europe. Al Manar’s (controversial) banning in France is a rare case. Hate speech regulation will affect television producers and broadcasters far more as shadowy looming parameters than as active checks. Radio is another matter. But it will be, apart from newspapers, the internet where the vast majority of prohibited speech which comes to the attention of parties prepared to bring complaints to tribunals and courts empowered to censor and punish will be found.

The suppression of Hate Speech, as the Ambassador noted in Budapest, has already established practises and important precedents with regard to the Internet in Europe. How internet regulation will develop – whether it will cleave largely to the content-neutral telecom model in which the technology initially debuted, or whether it will steadily be brought under an apparatus of regulation modelled on broadcasting law – remains uncertain, although the Yahoo case suggests that at least major providers

will be treated much like broadcasters, encouraged to restrict content. At the OSCE conference in Amsterdam, 2004 on Guaranteeing Media Freedom on the Internet, Dutch Law Professor Nico van Eijk, assessing the results of the World Summit on the Information Society in Geneva, 2003, emphasised the dangers of abandoning core legal principles in the face of new technologies:

'Nieuwe wijn in oude zakken': New wine in old bags. This Dutch saying, taken from the Bible, fully applies to regulating the internet, the information age, the digital age, the world wide web, or whatever term one uses to indicate the fact that electronic communications are at the core of our present society (for practical reasons I will stick to the term 'the Internet'). It's new wine in old bags.

What do I mean by this? What I will try to make clear is that the Internet is not something that changes fundamental rights such as the freedom of information. Freedom of information includes the right to receive and impart information as it has been defined throughout history and - within a European context - has been included in national constitutions and international treaties such as the European Convention on Human Rights. These old values - the old bags - are the foundations of society and should not be called into question because someone is pouring in a new wine called Internet.

The Internet is primarily a technology, a network enabling communications. The Internet is not something that changes the world. It is people who cause change by using technologies.

Turning to "the notion of technology-neutral regulation as a goal in its own right", Eijk said.

We see that a lot of legislation and regulation which attempts to reflect the underlying values is based on static technological concepts. These technological concepts evolve. Old ones sometimes disappear (the telegraph), others get new functions (film), and new ones are added (cd, dvd, the Internet). Because of this process, legislation often lags behind new developments. Existing legislation no longer works or creates all kinds of complexities. For example, in some countries the regulation of television depends on whether or not a screen is involved. This automatically makes the television regulation applicable to computer screens and therefore to the Internet. It is often said that in this new information age, we should no longer make a distinction between technologies. In principle, such an approach is good.

However, the question then arises: What kind of regulation should apply to the Internet? For example, should we use the telecom model (known for the absence of content control) or are we better served with the broadcasting model (known for its content regulation)? If this is the real question, the outcome is clear: with the increasing importance of the Internet as an information

resource, we may expect that more and more elements of the broadcasting model will enter the arena of Internet regulation, certainly when the Internet becomes a substitute for traditional broadcasting reception. However, this question is based on a false proposition. A technologically neutral approach should be based on the catalogue of fundamental rights. This could mean that regulation will not always be technologically neutral, but will partly depend on the technology used. This is nothing new. For example, take the jurisprudence of the European Court for Human Rights. It gives more freedom to certain types of expression in a closed, private environment such as a theatre or gallery than to expressions that are located in areas without restrictions and accessible to an undefined audience. In such a case, the regulation is not technology-neutral, but the underlying fundamental right is.

...We think the Internet is something special and make it our point of departure for regulatory intervention or non-intervention. This should be done the other way around. The source of inspiration should be basic constitutional values, such as the freedom of information and its interpretation in jurisprudence. These values are a 'living instrument' allowing us to interact with the factual circumstances, resulting in tailor-made regulation where necessary.

Van Eijk's reminder that basic constitutional principles and traditions of jurisprudence are a "living instrument" also emphasises the need to bear constantly in mind that the "instruments" of our political, social and legal practise are employed toward an end, the protection, nourishment and happiness of individuals relating freely and as equals. The area of legislation devoted to the physical and moral protection of ethnic and other minorities, and indeed for all individuals *as members of varied groups* (be it gender, sexual orientation, mother tongue, regional heritage, confession, disabilities) is expanding in response to persistent threats to that end. Laws created to protect "races" have been expanded to include "religions"; existing criminal law has been adjusted so that bigotry in the motive for the commission of certain crimes – acts already criminalised regardless of the identity of the victim - must be considered an aggravating factor in sentencing. Supranational bodies like the EU, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and others have issued directives, treaties, guidelines and declarations establishing related policies. It will be up to the media institutions, to broadcasters and programme producers, to respond to this environment in such a way as to realise the goals of these policies and laws, which measures alone can only suppress and deter the most aggressive and egregious messages and content without fostering the mutual knowledge and communication which alone can succeed in creating the climate which will, one hopes, one day render such measures themselves superfluous.

Folklorisation, Mystery, Suspicion, Criminalisation

From Giovanna Campani, "Migrants and Media: The Italian Case", in *Media and Migration*, Russell King and Nancy Wood, editors, Rutledge Research in Cultural and Media Studies 2001

Migrants and Stereotyping

Until 1990, the migrant is portrayed as a nomadic character, travelling around the country; it is not clear whether he (or she, but it is usually a he) will stay in Italy or not. The migrant has the face of Pap Khouma, the "elephant seller," author of an autobiographical novel, or of the main character of the film Pummarò, which appeared on screens in 1991....The migrant has a black face, is male, and comes from Africa. Pap Khouma and Jerry Masslo, the young South African murdered at the Villa Litterno south of Rome in 1989 and considered the first martyr of racism in Italy, are from Africa. The programme which Italian TV launches at this time and dedicates to immigration has the title Nonsolonero – "Black and not only" – and the journalist presenting it is a young black woman from Cape Verde.

The image changes in 1991. The migrant is no longer solely African but also originates from a large, ill-defined territory to the east – Eastern Europe and the Balkans. The migrant is an Albanian or a Slav, sometimes even a Slavonic Albanian (sic!). The Italian media display a comprehensive ignorance of the complex ethnic relations of the Balkan region. Albanians are not Slavonic, and neither are the gypsies who are often described in the media as "Slavonic nomads". If anything, the negative stereotyping of these populations is more marked than for the African. Albanians and Slavs are presented and thought of as being wild people (the horrors of the wars in the former Yugoslavia are used to support this) and pimps (in fact, it is true that some Albanians are involved in trafficking prostitutes). A small number of exceptional cases and events are fixed on and used to stereotype the whole immigrant population from that area....

Migrants' images have varied somewhat according to the three periods of migration, but they have three points in common. These are the 'folklorisation' of the migrants, their subordinate position, and their construction as sources of danger; the last of these three stereotypes has become every more important in recent years...

The folklorisation of migrants appears even in articles that try to present migrants in a positive way. For example, articles on the Santacruzian festival which the Filipino community celebrates in May uses phrases which describe it as a colourful meeting of people 'with almond eyes' where beautiful girls dressed in strange costumes parade about among the simple happiness of their community. Similarly, the New Year

events which the Chinese immigrants celebrate between January and February are described simplistically, focusing above all on the dragon which ventures forth from Chinatown, brought again by simple people with almond eyes, happy to carry him around the streets....

Another variant of the tendency towards folklorisation is the discourse of mystery and suspicion, which sometimes shades into our third category of danger.... This language is often applied to discussions of the Chinese in Italy, always described as living in Chinatown, a mysterious place where everything raises suspicion. Sometimes the image changes even in the same newspaper. For instance in Il Corriere della Sera, in the 'Health' or 'Culture' pages, we find articles on acupuncture which describe the technique as an extremely interesting curative treatment, whilst in the Cronaca pages of the same issue can be read examples of the worst folklorisation of the same phenomenon – illegal 'so-called doctors' practising acupuncture 'in secret flats'.

*The second image stresses the immigrants subordinate position, in which they are always compared to the poorest and most socially marginal Italians. This corresponds partly to reality, but for the immigrants, certain stereotypical aspects of their subordination and marginality are often underlined and generalised. A good example is the use by the media of the derogatory term *vu cumprà* (slang for 'do you want to buy?') to refer to immigrant street sellers and also, on occasion, to all immigrants. The many cases of success, of 'good integration', of mixed marriages, of the new generation of Italo-Capeverdeans (there are quite a lot of children of these mixed marriages) and the Italo-Chinese (socialised in Italy) are often ignored.*

The third image is the criminalisation of migrants. Over the last few years, the connection between migration and criminality has become increasingly stressed by the media, to the extent that it has virtually become a national obsession. Lots of statistics are bandied about, which obscure the complexity of the issue.

A Typology of Media Effects

From Alex Hargreaves, "Ethnic Relations In Britain and France" in *Media and Migration*, Russell King and Nancy Wood, editors, Rutledge Research in Cultural and Media Studies 2001

Some of the complexities and ambiguities surrounding the relationship between the media and minority ethnic groups are apparent in coverage of a recent (2000) upsurge of asylum-seekers from Central and Eastern Europe entering Dover and other nearby British ports. In December 1998, Kent police threatened to bring criminal charges against a number of newspaper editors over their coverage of these events. The police were concerned, for example, by the editorial in the Dover Express which stated: "Illegal immigrants, asylum-seekers, bootleggers and scum-of-the-earth drug dealers have targeted our beloved coastline. We are left with the back-draft of a nation's sewage and no cash to wash it down the drain." As a consequence of this and other articles accusing asylum seekers of criminal patterns of behaviour, the group editor of the Dover Express and other local papers, was warned by the police that he risked being charged with inciting racial hatred. In response, Hudson claimed "I'm merely reflecting my mailbag. I don't think we are making news, we are merely reflecting it." Hudson's denial of any causal effects resulting from articles published in his and other newspapers was flatly rejected by the police spokesman who said: "There has been a lot of inflammatory coverage which has raised tensions among communities and attracted members of far-right organisations."

In contrast with disputed claims such as this, an earlier episode involving the sudden increase in the number of Roma, or gypsies, from Eastern Europe seeking asylum at Dover in 1997 offers an usually clear cut instance of a behavioural effect linked to a particular media event. Scores of Roma in the Czech Republic sought asylum in Britain shortly after seeing a film report on Czech television in which a family of Roma asylum-seekers from Prague spoke enthusiastically about the welcome they had received in Dover. Within a few weeks of the film being broadcast, more than 200 Roma landed in Dover requesting refugee status. A similar upsurge in applications had been reported by the Canadian authorities a few months earlier after a documentary film broadcast on Czech television had painted an idyllic picture of the lives of Roma asylum seekers admitted to Canada from the Czech Republic.

...The limited effects of a single piece of media coverage can be seen in the mixed public reaction to a particularly emotive episode during the 1996 sit-ins in Paris by African sans-papiers, undocumented immigrants seeking regularisation. Graphic television images of a police operation in which immigrant families were expelled from a church in which they had taken refuge partially backfired against the centre-right government of Alain Juppé. The authorities had hoped to end the long-running sit in by a decisive intervention demonstrating to public opinion that they were on top of the

situation. In an opinion poll carried out immediately after the police operation, 46% of those questioned said they felt sympathetic toward the sans papiers, compared to 36% expressing hostility. Some 53% disapproved of the police action, while 42% supported it. Yet in the same survey, 68% of the respondents said they wanted to maintain or strengthen the Pasqua laws, which had created the circumstances against which the sans-papiers were protesting. Only 23% wanted to relax or abolish those laws. While television viewers had apparently been upset by images of women and children being dragged off by the police, the emotive impact had not been sufficient to produce a change of heart on the basic principle at stake in the sans-papiers' demand for regularisation: 67% of those interviewed were in favour of deporting them as illegal immigrants, with only 27% favouring regularisation.

A possible example of a more significant effect generated by a relatively brief but prominent piece of media coverage may be found in the 1992 British general election. During the campaign, opinion polls consistently indicated that Labour was set to win. When the Conservatives retained office, there was much debate over the apparently misleading findings of pre-election polls. It was frequently suggested that respondents had lied to pollsters about their voting intentions. Another common argument was that there had been deficiencies in sampling techniques. An Alternative hypothesis was advanced by Billing and Golding (1992). Drawing on systematic analysis of media election coverage, they argued that a late swing (undetectable in pre-election polls) may have occurred as a result of scare-mongering a few days before the election by leading Conservatives, whose warnings of an influx of immigrants in the event of a Labour victory were given front page coverage in the largely pro-Tory tabloid press....Billing and Golding observed:

The combined readership of the Tory tabloids is roughly seventeen million. Maybe half the electorate were exposed to such lurid 'fear' stories, playing on racist feelings at the latest stage of the campaign...Even if only two in a hundred electors were swayed by the immigration scares in the Tory tabloids, the effects would have been profound: such a late swing would have been sufficient to give the Conservatives their overall majority. (Billing and Golding, 'Did the race card tip the balance?', *New Community*, 1992)

Imagining Immigrants

A Filmography

- 1917 *The Immigrant*, dir. Charlie Chaplin
- 1948 *My Girl Tisa*, dir. Elliot Nugent
- 1961 *West Side Story*, dir. Robert Wise & Jerome Robbins
- 1963 *America, America*, dir. Elia Kazan
- 1969 *Popi*, dir. Arthur Hiller
- 1969 *Soleil Ô*, dir. Med Hondo
- 1973 *Pane e Cioccolato*, dir. Franco Brusati
- 1973 *Les Bicots Nègres Vos Voisins*, dir. Med Hondo
- 1981, *Ragtime*, dir. Milos Foreman
- 1982 *Moonlighting*, dir. Jerzy Skolimowski
- 1983 *El Norte*, Gregory Nava
- 1984 *Moscow On The Hudson*, Paul Mazursku
- 1984 *Stranger Than Paradise*, dir. Jim Jarmusch
- 1985 *My Beautiful Laundrette*, dir. Stephen Frears
- 1985 *Dim Sum*, dir. Wayne Wang
- 1987 *Good Morning, Babylon*, dir. Paolo & Vittorio Taviani
- 1989 *Eat A Bowl of Tea*, dir. Wayne Wang
- 1990 *Avalon*, dir. Barry Levinson
- 1990 *Pummarò*, dir. Michele Placido
- 1990 *The Paper Wedding*, dir. Michel Brault
- 1992 *Mississippi Masala*, dir. Mira Nair
- 1993 *Masala*, dir. Srinivas Krishna

1993 *Combination Platter*, dir. Tony Chen

1993 *The Joy Luck Club*, dir. Wayne Wang

1993 *The Wedding Banquet*, dir. Ang Lee

1996 *The Perez Family*, dir. Mira Nair

1996 *Lone Star*, dir. John Sayles

1997 *Mémoires d'immigrés*, dir. Yamina Benguigui

1998 *Hyderabad Blues*, dir. Nageesh Kukunoor

1998 *Watani*, Med Hondo

1999 *East Is East*, dir. Damien O'Donnell

1999 *La Cuidad*, dir. David Riker

1999 *Catfish In Black Bean Sauce*, dir. Chi Moui Lo

2000 *Bread and Roses*, dir. Ken Loach

2000 *Samia*, dir. Phillipe Faucon

2001 *Caravan 841*, dir. Zion Rubin

2002 *White Teeth*, dir. Julian Jarrold

2002 *Spellbound*, dir. Jeffrey Blitz

2002 *Bend it Like Beckham*, dir. Gurinder Chahda

2002 *My Big Fat Greek Wedding*, dir. Joel Zwick

2003 *Lost Boys of Sudan*, dir. Mylan & John Shenk

2003 *Dirty Pretty Things*, dir. Stephen Frears

2003 *Green Card Fever*, dir. Bala Rakeshkarumi

2003 *Lana's Rain*, dir. Michael Ojeda

2003 *House of Sand and Fog*, dir. Vadim Perelman

2003 *In America*, dir. Jim Sheridan

2003 *L'Esquive*, Abdel Kachiche

2003 *Mythos Canadiensis*, dir. David Widdington

2004 *The Gatekeeper*, dir. John Carlos Frey

2004 *A Day Without A Mexican*, dir. Serio Arau

2004 *The Terminal*, dir. Stephen Speilberg

2004 *Maria Full of Grace*, dir. Joshua Marston

2004 *Spanglish*, dir. James L. Brookes

2004 *Saving Face*, dir. Alice Wu

2005, *Va, vis et deviens*, dir. Radu Mihaileanu

2005 *Choosing Exile*, dir. Marc Radomsky

2005 *Milla, L'Europe au pied du mur*, dir. Girardot et Baque


2005 *La Petite Jérusalem*, dir. Karin Albou

2005 *The Other*, dir . Lucia Rikaki

2005 *La Tragedia de Macario*, dir. Pable Véliz

Scandalous Imagery

I Stayed in Poland, Come One, Come All!



In the summer of 2005, the Polish tourist board launched this campaign poster in France. It was intended as a witty and forgiving riposte to the “Polish Plumber” theme, the bogey figure threatened as a menace to French jobs who had been conjured by the xenophobic, populist-nationalist minority in the “Non” camp of the European Constitutional Treaty Referendum. The dreamy plumber who has stayed in his native country assures the French, according to the campaign’s designer, there are no hard feelings, and French tourists will be very welcome in the new EU member state.

(Sony) PlayStation: Portable White Is Coming




This billboard ad for Sony Playstation appeared in the Netherlands, and was withdrawn after a campaign of protests which deemed it offensive and racist. The ad campaign’s designers appear to have intended neither malice nor covert offence, but

to have in fact been overconfident in their belief they were addressing a “post-racist” public who could now find the playful deployment of tropes of a purportedly bygone racism objects of fun and available for innocent re-use to sell toys. It turned out a portion of the public was not convinced that white supremacy and race war was so passé that its imagery was a safe and harmless vocabulary for joking.



Girbaud Jeans Ad: “Parisian denim purveyor Marthe et François Girbaud staged Da Vinci's *Last Supper* in drag last week to mass outrage in Europe. The corporatization of Jesus and the girl Christ was more than the faithful could take. Girbaud's apostles in couture roused first the uproar of Italian bishops and then French judges, who banned the ad and levied a 100,000 fine a day until it disappears. The church's lawyer drew a direct connection between sacrilegious images and violence in schools.”
(*Beyond Belief*, Jo Guldi, March 25, 2005, *Counterpunch*)



Jyllands Posten Cartoon: "These weird alliances confront Europe's Muslims with a difficult choice: the only political force that does not reduce them to second-class citizens and allows them the space to express their religious identity are the "godless" atheist liberals, while those closest to their religious social practice, their Christian mirror-image, are their greatest political enemies. The paradox is that Muslims' only real allies are not those who first published the caricatures for shock value, but those who, in support of the ideal of freedom of expression, reprinted them.

While a true atheist has no need to boost his own stance by provoking believers with blasphemy, he also refuses to reduce the problem of the Muhammad caricatures to one of respect for other's beliefs. Respect for other's beliefs as the highest value can mean only one of two things: either we treat the other in a patronizing way and avoid hurting him in order not to ruin his illusions, or we adopt the relativist stance of multiple "regimes of truth," disqualifying as violent imposition any clear insistence on truth. " (*Defenders of the Faith*, Slavoj Zizek, *New York Times* 12 March 2006)